Though this serves the purpose of giving the situation at a glance.
Hello, everyone. Good morning, afternoon or evening, and welcome to this edition of Elsewhere in Focus. You can find all the articles in the series here (along with my other diaries).
Remember the Satan and the deep blue sea between which the Congolese people of the Democratic Republic of Congo are being ground down? We discussed one part of the equation, the neocolonialist extraction of DR Congo’s minerals and its impact on the people of the country, last week. In this second part, we focus on the other part: M23, Rwanda and the rest that feed ethnic violence in Eastern Congo.
Remember that this conflict is deeply entangled in the exploitation of DRC’s mineral wealth just like the story discussed last week. Just that the origins and especially the means are somewhat different.
All right then, let us get into it.
Democratic Republic of Congo: Part II—M23, Rwanda and Ethnic Conflict in East DRC
Rwanda, M23, and the History of Current Conflict in DRC
It starts with the Rwandan genocide of Tutsis. Well, it started before that with President Mobutu’s autocratic regime backed by Western powers and Belgian colonialism before that, but the Rwandan intervention begins with Rwandan genocide.
Global Conflict Tracker gives you the history of the conflict (Updated, 25 April 2024).
Since 1996, conflict in eastern DRC has led to approximately six million deaths. The First Congo War (1996–1997) began in the wake of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, during which ethnic Hutu extremists killed an estimated one million minority ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda (DRC’s neighbor to the east). During and following the genocide, nearly two million Hutu refugees crossed the Congolese border, mostly settling in refugee camps in the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. A small subset of those Rwandans who entered DRC were Hutu extremists who began organizing militias within the Congo. Pressure intensified as Tutsi militias organized against the Hutu groups and as foreign powers began taking sides.
Following the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF) victory against the genocidal Rwandan government, the new Tutsi-led government began its involvement in DRC (then known as The Republic of Zaire). Rwandan troops, under the leadership of President Paul Kagame, and Congo-based Tutsi militias with Rwandan backing launched an invasion of Zaire, which was ruled at the time by Dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Kigali justified both efforts by arguing that Hutu groups in eastern DRC were still a threat to their Tutsi population and that the Mobutu regime was harboring Hutu extremists who had fled across the border. Rwanda waged the First Congo War against Zaire with the help of other African states (most significantly Uganda, but also Angola and Burundi) who had their own security concerns related to Mobutu’s support of rebel groups across the continent. The Rwandan coalition’s invasion was coordinated with the help of Zaire’s then-opposition leader Laurent Kabila. Thousands died; some casualties were former Hutu militants and members of armed groups, but many were refugees and non-combatant Congolese in North and South Kivu, in eastern DRC. Methods of warfare were brutal, especially those employed by Rwandan soldiers and Tutsi groups. The Kabila-Kagame coalition won the First Congo War in 1997 when Mobutu fled Kinshasa. Kabila was installed as president of Zaire and changed the country’s name back to The Democratic Republic of Congo.
In 1998, the Second Congo War broke out following the deterioration of relations between Kigali and Kinshasa. In an attempt to diminish the impression that Rwanda held undue influence over the Congolese government, Kabila denied claims that Rwanda had been responsible for winning the war and placing him in power. Kabila also began removing ethnic Tutsis from his government and took measures to weaken Rwanda’s military presence in eastern DRC. By the late 1990s, it was becoming clear to the world that targeted campaigns against Hutu populations during the First Congo War (mostly led by Kagame’s army) amounted to war crimes, a growing international consensus that reflected poorly on the fledgling Kabila regime.
In a reversal of alliances, Kabila ordered all foreign troops out of the Congo and allowed Hutu armed groups to organize at the border once again. Rwanda responded by invading in 1998. Kigali’s stated aim was to create a zone in the DRC-Rwanda borderlands controlled by its own troops in order to create more distance from Hutu groups in eastern DRC. Congolese forces supported by Angola (which also reversed alliances following the ascent of Laurent Kabila), Namibia, and Zimbabwe fought the Rwandan, Ugandan, and Burundi militaries, as well as various rebel groups supported by Kigali and Kampala. Amidst the chaos of war, Laurent Kabila was assassinated in a 2001 coup attempt planned by his own aides and guards. Those involved were imprisoned and Kabila’s son, Joseph Kabila, took power. The Second Congo War was formally brought to a close under the junior Kabila in 2002, and while estimates vary greatly, the death toll of the Second Congo War and the associated humanitarian disaster may have reached over three million people by 2004.
Between 2002 and 2003, Rwanda, Uganda, and DRC began implementing a set of peace agreements that authorized a transitional government in Kinshasa led by Joseph Kabila. Despite these agreements, the establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions, and the presence of a renewed UN peacekeeping force, unrest and clashes persisted in eastern DRC. Joseph Kabila was formally inaugurated following a long-awaited popular election in 2006.
Rwanda was not the only neighbouring country involved. In fact, so many African countries were involved in the Second Congo War that it is called Africa’s World War.
World Without Genocide has more on the story (updated, October 2023).
However, Congo’s instability remained even after the 2003 peace agreements. Specifically, a proxy war between Rwanda and Congo continued in the east until the end of 2008. Here, Congolese Tutsi warlord General Laurent Nkunda waged a campaign to destroy Hutu rebels from the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).[9] The FDLR, a Hutu-led group stemming from the 1994 genocide, was bent on destroying Tutsi influence and uses violent, terror-based means like those used during the genocide to do so. Nkudna accused the Congolese government of backing the FDLR.[10] A change in the conflict came about in late 2008 when Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo joined forces to combat the FDLR in North and South Kivu provinces.[11] But the bitter conflict has continued unabated, and Congolese government troops, backed by thousands of U.N. peacekeepers, have failed to defeat the FDLR rebels.[12]
Tensions are still high on the Rwandan border, where Rwanda’s Tutsis continue to feel threatened by Hutu rebels. Since the majority of the forces in the DRC’s conflict were non-governmental militias, disarming or controlling them since the ceasefires were signed has proven difficult. Conflict continues over the plentiful natural resources in the DRC. Violence is especially prevalent in the East, which is rich in minerals, diamonds, and timber.[13]
The Lord’s Resistance Army has expanded its operations from northern Uganda into the DRC. The LRA is notorious for kidnapping children, forcing them to kill and maim innocent victims, and using young girls as sex slaves. Attacks by the LRA spread fear and the threat of famine through northeast DRC as the LRA extended its abduction and terror raids across the region. [14] New conflicts between the LRA and FARDC have left thousands of civilians dead. The LRA is documented as still active in its abductions in 2019. [15]
The ethnic factions involved in the conflict have split up many times. M23, whose name comes up frequently in the context of ethnic violence in Eastern DRCongo, is the result of one of those splits. Ruth Mudingayai writes for Africaisacountry about M23 and how Rwanda benefits from the conflict in her piece Congo beyond the hashtags (28 March 2024).
There were multiple attempts to bring an end to the war, from the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in 1999 to the installation of a transitional government in 2003 that placed Joseph Kabila as head of state after the assassination of his father in 2001. Insurgency persisted, however, and new militia groups seemed to sprout daily as violence continued to escalate in the region. Militia groups would go through leadership and name changes; the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) split into different factions with multiple leaders. The war and instability allowed for the illegal transportation of artisanally mined minerals into neighboring countries, making it clear that the motives for the invasion had little to do with Interahamwe but everything to do with the minerals found in the region.
Paul Kagame, the president of Rwanda, and hailed by former US president Bill Clinton as “one the greatest leaders of our time,” is at the eye of this humanitarian storm. It was under his directives that the RPF led an invasion of eastern Congo without impunity in 1996 with the support of the UK, France, and the US. The goal was and continues to be to control and exploit the coltan reserves: minimal amounts of tantalum are found in Rwanda, yet Rwanda is a top exporter of coltan. In 2021, Rwanda made approximately $516 million on mined minerals, including coltan. By indirectly causing instability in the locations where coltan is found in surplus in the DRC, Rwanda has managed to siphon billions of dollars worth of the valuable mineral to attract foreign investment over the years. Despite the Rwandan government denying all claims, the UN has presented conclusive evidence of the state funding the M23, and continuing to spill Congolese blood on Congolese soil without remorse.
In April 2012, former rebels defected from the Congolese army and launched the M23 group in North Kivu. In the space of three months, 200,000 people were forced to leave their homes as the rebels stationed at Bunagana, a town at the border of Uganda. On November 20, 2012, the M23 went on to take control of Goma. After almost two years of merciless operations, the M23 agreed to stop their rampage and were driven out of North Kivu after being defeated by the FARDC (the DRC armed forces) and their allies in the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
Despite the Second Congo War formally ending in 2003 and the M23 surrendering in 2013, the Congolese people are still not free. The nation’s people are still dying; women and children are still victims of sexual violence; minerals continue to be trafficked and Uganda and Rwanda continue their covert attacks on the DRC through the use of rebel groups.
The M23 took up arms again in 2021 and after another ceasefire, launched a new attack in Nov 2023.
Gerald Imray had reported on the conflict for AP (19 Feb 2024).
Eastern Congo has been beset by conflict for years, with M23 among more than 100 armed groups vying for a foothold in the mineral-rich area near the border with Rwanda. Some have been accused of carrying out mass killings.
There’s been an upsurge in fighting in recent weeks between M23 rebels and Congo army forces, and it comes as the United Nations plans to withdraw peacekeepers from the region by the end of the year.
Tensions are also rising between Congo and Rwanda, with them blaming each other for supporting various armed groups. Congo accuses Rwanda of backing M23.
This weekend, the U.S. State Department condemned what it called the “worsening violence.” A group of aid agencies has estimated that 1 million people have already been displaced by fighting in the last three months.
February saw a fresh bout of violence.
M23 launched new attacks late last year and has ramped them up in recent weeks. The group is now threatening to take the key town of Sake, about 27 kilometers (16 miles) west of Goma. That could cause food and aid supplies to be cut off from Goma, which had a population of around 600,000 a few years ago, but now holds more than 2 million people, according to aid agencies, as people flee violence in surrounding towns and villages.
The advance of rebels on Sake “poses an imminent threat to the entire aid system” in eastern Congo, the Norwegian Refugee Council said. It said 135,000 people were displaced in just five days in early February.
The violence has also sparked protests from the capital, Kinshasa, to Goma, with angry demonstrators saying the international community is not doing enough to push back against M23 and not taking a hard enough stance against Rwanda.
Other Players
As World Without Genocide notes, there are other countries involved in the conflict. Martina Schwikowski writes for Deutsche Welle (DW) about Rwanda and Uganda’s role in the conflict (22 February 2024).
The ADF, historically a Ugandan Muslim-majority rebel coalition, established itself in eastern DRC in 1995 and has operated for years along the border areas of both countries.
Uganda's intervention has further disrupted the fragile regional balance, Titeca says. "This is the main reason for the emergence of the M23 at the end of 2021."
This military rebel group, which consists mainly of ethnic Tutsis, broke away from the Congolese army just over ten years ago. In 2012, the rebels carried out a major offensive and captured Goma.
However, the M23 rebellion was crushed by the army in 2013, and the fighters and their leaders fled to Uganda and Rwanda, Titeca explained.
A negotiated peace agreement — seen as a crucial step towards ending the violence in eastern Congo, including the integration of the M23 into the Congolese army — has not been implemented.
The M23 group accuses the Congolese authorities of failing to combat the Rwandan Hutu rebels who settled in eastern Congo after the Rwandan genocide in 1994, as well as other armed groups that pose a threat to Congolese Tutsis.
"The resurgence of the M23 must be seen as a reflection of the deteriorating relations between Kinshasa and Kigali," Titeca added.
As the Africa Is a Country piece and others note, the Rwandan and Ugandan involvement doesn’t just have an ethnic aspect. It has a mercenary aspect too. Rwanda, Uganda and Angola all gain from the militarization of mining in DRC.
Formal and informal trade between DR Congo and Rwanda is flourishing, especially in gold. "Gold is an important source of foreign currency for Kigali, and much of it comes from eastern Congo," Titeca said.
But it is not just its value that has placed gold at the heart of controversy. It occupies an important place in the geopolitical competition between Uganda, Rwanda, and the Congo, Jason Stearns, director of the Congo Research Group, said in a report.
Before the M23 rebellion even began, Rwanda's largest export was Congolese gold, which rose from 1% in 2014 to 47% in 2020. "In Uganda, we can see a similar trend, culminating in 2021, when gold made up 56% of its exports", Stearns wrote.
According to analyst Titeca, Rwanda considers parts of eastern Congo as part of its sphere of influence. But in November 2021, the Ugandan army sent troops to the eastern DRC in a joint offensive with the Congolese army against the ADF (Allied Democratic Forces) rebels.
The UN Situation Report on DRC released on 25th April has details of other militias involved.
On April 6, clashes and reprisal attacks involving Cooperative for the Development of the Congo (CODECO)-affiliated elements and the rival Zaire militia in Mongbalu Health Zone’s Galayi town, in Ituri Province’s Djugu Territory, resulted in the deaths of at least 25 people, according to international media. The CODECO-related attack in Galayi follows a trend of worsening humanitarian and security conditions in Ituri in recent months. Violence between CODECO and Zaire militia elements, as well as attacks attributed to Allied Democratic Forces armed group elements, resulted in numerous protection violations, including reports of killings, kidnappings, and forced labor in Ituri’s Djugu, Irumu, and Mambasa territories in March, according to the UN. These incidents have also led to multiple waves of population displacement; more than 13,000 people fled armed group attacks in Drodro Health Zone’s Kpanga, Libo, and Lidjoba localities to relatively stable neighboring areas between mid- and late March. The influx of individuals has exacerbated humanitarian needs, with relief actors reporting more than 164,000 displaced persons across 66 displaced persons sites around Ituri in urgent need of assistance.
The World Without Genocide contends that China supplies arms to all sides of the conflict.
Rwanda and Uganda—and militias with their support—have financial stakes in Congolese mines (though they are not always legitimate), adding more fuel to the fire. Additionally, China is involved in both the internal conflict and the economic landscape of the DRC. The Congolese government is employing Chinese drones and weaponry in its battle against the M23 rebels. Uganda has also purchased Chinese arms to carry out military operations within DRC’s borders. China’s negotiations with Congolese leadership, especially during the Joseph Kabila regime, have granted Chinese firms unprecedented access to metals crucial for the mass production of electronics and clean energy technologies. The Beijing-Kinshasa relationship came under international scrutiny leading up to President Kabila’s resignation in 2019 when evidence revealed that Chinese capital—intended for infrastructure investment as repayment for mining rights—was being funneled to Joseph Kabila and his associates. China and DRC’s complex, multi-layered economic and military relationship has resulted in limited access to the Congo’s vital resources and profits for other countries and the Congolese people themselves.
Russia also maintains a relationship with the DRC. Following its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow has been courting support from several African nations, including the Congo. While DRC voted in favor of a February 2023 resolution to condemn the war and demand Russia’s withdrawal from Ukraine, other African countries with stronger ties to Moscow abstained or voted in opposition.[18]
In sum, as Congo Beyond the Hashtags note, nearly 12 million people have died due to all this conflict through the decades. Twenty five million need humanitarian assistance. Seven million have been displaced. The UN, World Without Genocide, and other reports note the prevalence of sexual assault and rape as well as abductions apart from murders. There is also environmental damage.
There is a UN peacekeeping mission in DRC called MONUSCO, which the locals protested against because of human rights violations (note, it is a good article on the force and gives important context and details). The UN mission is now winding down. As per the AP report linked above, a multi-national peace keeping force under Southern Africa regional bloc will take its place.
What Is the West’s Role Here?
Bossissi Nkuba and Liliane Nabintu Kabagale write for Africaisacountry in Between M23 and electric vehicles about EU’s complicity.
France and the US have condemned Rwanda and demanded they leave Congo. But such impactless phrases are very common; they represent a pattern of verbal censure without the follow-through of substantive sanctions. All of this is not surprising, since the US, UK, and EU swiftly imposed drastic sanctions on Russia for invading Ukraine, while they unconditionally support Israel’s bombing of Gaza and, ironically, send food and other aid to the bombing victims. Initiatives such as the US’s Dodd-Frank Act or OECD’s due diligence guidelines, aiming to cut the financing channels of armed groups, also lose credibility as their initiators support Rwanda despite its links to the same armed groups. Knowing that Rwanda has no industry that can either use the looted minerals or produce the guns to sustain years of M23 activities, a ban on gun purchase or mineral export by the US and EU would significantly challenge its motivation to support M23 or any other destabilizing force in the DRC.
Rwanda’s involvement in destabilizing the Eastern DRC is not the only problem that reveals contradictions in EU and US policies when it comes to DRC’s minerals and peace efforts. Their attitudes regarding the cobalt supply chain questions their valuation of Congolese lives vis-à-vis their economic interests. With the impending ban in developed economies on internal combustion vehicles, it remains difficult to find a substitute, underlining the strategic importance of cobalt for the future. Sodium-based batteries have been considered, but their density is not practical for cars but more suitable for homes. Despite this, the cobalt, lithium, and nickel mining sector is valued at about $11 billion, whereas the electric vehicle (EV) market is valued at over $7 trillion. Knowing that countries in the Global South have been shaped by their colonizers and are still maintained by Western powers as raw material providers, with as little as possible value addition on their soil; it is clear to see which countries are set to benefit from the booming EV market. Furthermore, this value distribution thus offers little to the DRC, which has around 70% of the global cobalt deposits and 3T minerals necessary for various electronic devices and the green energy transition.
Unfortunately, there is little room for countries in the Global South to negotiate a larger share of the EV pie. The economic war that China undergoes versus the EU and US are clear proof of that. Indeed, while the EU is criticized for its hypocrisy in blocking the imports of Chinese electric vehicles and simultaneously campaigning for a shift to EV’s to respond to climate change, the importation of batteries from China by European industry seems to raise no questions. One may wonder whether the actual reason for blocking cars and not their batteries is that the EU wants most of the value addition to be made on its soil, akin to the Biden administration’s goals in the US.
As I mentioned in Part I, EU, US, UK and other countries (including Asian countries) continue to benefit from minerals extracted through child labour and poorly paid labour in DR Congo; be it via Rwandan, Ugandan or Angolan exports or through Chinese batteries. Whatever trade or economic relations they have with Rwanda—including that of deporting migrants as the recently passed UK law proposes to do—, those relations are used to extract blood and minerals from the DR Congo.
What Do We Do?
There have been discussions of sanctions or divestment; using only refurbished electronics, etc. However, the effects of changing consumer behaviour through persuasion are not vast enough to make a difference—it is far easier to change people’s habits through laws and regulations and enforcement than by persuading them one by one in my opinion—and in any case are not enough.
As Bossissi Nkuba and Liliane Nabintu Kabagale say, the West needs to sanction Rwanda to ensure Rwanda does not benefit from minerals from DRC.
Crack down on arms sales, which honestly they should be doing for other countries such as the Caribbean too. Where do you think Haiti gets its arms for their gang wars?
But I digress.
A report titled Trading Conflict for Development from 2009 written by Nicholas Garret and Harrison Mitchell Says that strengthening the government and improving transparency in the international trade is the solution.
As the economic rationale to conflicts has been dominant in analyses, the principal response offered by the international community has been advocacy and the application of economic ‘sticks and carrots’. These have often taken the form of calls for mineral boycotts, targeted sanctions, or developing assurance systems designed to verify the origin of minerals. Based on the understanding of the militarisation of mineral production and trade as a reflection of governance weakness in Eastern DR Congo, this report proposes a different set of conclusions and recommendations with one aim: to harness the national and regional development potential of the trade in minerals from Eastern DR Congo through trade formalisation.
Drawing on thorough on-the-ground research and investigations conducted since March 2007, this report suggests that trade militarisation is a symptom of conflict rather than its cause, and therefore asks policy makers to address the real causes of insecurity in Eastern DR Congo. These are identified as the ubiquitous governance weaknesses, and the inability of the Congolese state to maintain the monopoly of violence. The report suggests that, instead of trying to ‘stop’ or ‘interrupt’ the minerals trade, formalising a large percentage of it would contribute to achieving long-term security. This is because stopping or interrupting approaches are not only impossible to successfully implement in the context of Eastern DR Congo; they also have severe retarding effects on regional development.
It is a huge challenge for policy makers and the private sector to turn Eastern DR Congo’s mineral deposits into a sustainable mining sector that contributes to development. Achieving this requires a political process that will inspire the creation of political institutions that can transform incentive systems for economic actors. These institutions are currently structured in ways that weaken the state further as they allow for security around natural resource deposits to be negotiated locally. While this practice can offer someshort-term benefits, in all likelihood they reinforce a feedback loop of weak governance.
The report gives detailed diagnosis and solutions for the problem. That may not be particularly useful given that it was brought out in 2009, and we are still here. But their research on European and Asian countries’ connections to the trade is still informative. (They don’t find evidence for direct Rwandan involvement in the conflict but UN has since published a report proving such involvement.)
If governments want to find a solution, they will. Thus, what we first need to do is create awareness. It is clear that many of our governments are already connected with the conflict. Either by benefiting from it, or through aid, and most likely, both. However, as Bossissi Nkuba and Liliane Nabintu Kabagale say, there is no will for strong action. Not for sanctioning neighbouring countries or in ensuring that supply chains are transparent and acquired through fair trade. There is no talk even of providing DRC with enough knowledge, skill, and infrastructure support to set up industries of their own to compete at scale in the global market.
We should be asking for this from our elected officials.
Make Congo’s mineral wealth for Congolese development a key issue for elections, activism, and outreach. Given how almost all of the world is implicated in this exploitation and given how much we need these minerals and people for a sustainable transition to green energy, all of us should be in some manner or other engaged in ensuring that our countries do their best to support the people of Congo against predatory neighbours, great powers, emerging nations, and capitalists. Ensure their needs are met and they thrive.
Those articles I shared, especially from Africaisacountry, lists accounts that you can follow to keep up with the news. Follow them on twitter or instagram, remember to share information, then demand action—at least those who are good at that part of the work.
I will stop here. Until next Wednesday, everyone.
Note that I am not here this Wednesday, so there will be no tweet updates about Sudan, Tigray, Congo, Syria and other countries in the comments.
Stay safe. Be well. Take care.
May we find the will and the drive to take action against exploitation and extraction everywhere, be it in Congo or Chhattisgarh (India).
